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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW*
In

the

opinion

of

appellant,

the

following

issues

are

presented:
1.

Whether the convictions for theft by embezzlement must

be reversed because there was insufficient evidence to support
prosecution on that basis and prosecution for theft by deception
was barred by the statute of limitations.
2.

Whether the convictions must be reversed in this case

because it is impossible to tell whether the jury found appellant
guilty for offenses that were clearly barred by the statute of
limitations.
3.

Whether

the trial court erred

in denying appellant's

motion for a new trial when appellantfs new counsel did not have
time to prepare an adequate record and the Court did not hold a
evidentiary hearing on appellant's motion.
4.

Whether the monetary portion of the sentence was illegal

because the Court imposed a fine and restitution on appellant,
when he had no financial ability to pay them, and it ordered
restitution for persons not named as victims in the information.

This case has not previously been before this Court.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In an information filed on September 10, 1984, appellant was
charged with nine counts of theft in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§§76-6-404

and

76-6-412

(1953).

At

a

jury

trial

held

on

September 17 through 24, 1984, before the Honorable George E.
Balliff appellant was found guilty on eight counts, and one count
(count 9) was dismissed at the close of all the evidence.
On October 26, 1984, the Court sentenced appellant to a term
of imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 15 years on
each count, said counts to run concurrently with each other.
Appellant was also ordered to pay a fine of $1,000.00 on each
count and was further ordered to make restitution not to exceed
$500,000.00 to the individuals who invested money in his project.
The

restitution

amount

was

to

be

determined

either

(a) by

agreement between the defendant and the Division of Corrections,
(b) as determined through civil litigation, or

(c) by further

order of the court.
On November 5r 1984, appellantf though new counsel, filed a
motion for new trial and a motion for additional time to submit a
memorandum and procure the necessary evidence in support of his
motion.

The motion for new trial was denied by an order and

decision of the Court dated February 8, 1985.
was filed on February 15, 1985.
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A notice of appeal

INTRODUCTION
Beginning

in the late summer of 1979, appellant pre-sold

condominiums to be built on property he had recently acquired in
Provo, Utah.

At trial, the buyers claimed that appellant told

them he would put their money in trust and use it only in the
project.

Appellant

did not hold the buyers' money

in trust

pending construction, but immediately deposited their money in
his general real estate operating account.

Some of the buyers'

money was used on the project, while most of it was used on
appellant's unrelated ventures.
Testifying in his own defense, appellant acknowledged that
he did not put the money in trust, nor did he ever intend to do
so»

Rather, appellant believed he was permitted to keep the

buyers' money upon receipt, and use it for any purpose, because
the

earnest

money

non-refundable.

agreements

expressly

stated

the money

was

The project failed when appellant was unable to

obtain construction financing.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

The Government's Case.
In late July

1979, appellant and Sunwest II Development

Corporation entered into an agreement to purchase jointly from
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Martensen Real Estate a parcel of undeveloped land known as the
Temple Hills property in Provo, Utah (Tr. 25.)•

In order to

raise capitalf appellant pre-sold condominiums that he planned to
2
build on the property to a number of buyers (Tr. 27-28).
The

date

of

investment

by

each

person

named

in

the

information/ the amount invested and the date appellant deposited
their funds into his own checking account are as follows:
Count
Investor Amount Invested
Date of
Date deposited
Investment into Appellant's
checking account

I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII

Yalden
Jolley
Smith
Smith }
Smith
Smith
Barlow
Pace

$7,333.33
$30,000.00

11-6-79
8-27-79
8-31-79
$33,000.00(total) 8-31-79
8-31-79
$5,333.33
11-6-79
$22,000.00
9-5-79
$11,000.00
8-31-79

See Second Amended Information;

12-18-79
8-31-79
}

9-4-79
12-18-79
9-10-79
9-4-79

Exhibits 7, 47, 73.

"Tr." refers to the three volumes of transcriptf successively
paginated, which contain most of the trial proceedings. "P. Tr."
refers to a partial transcript of trial containing most of the
testimony of two witnesses, i.e., Rod Bullock and G. David Smith.
"N. Tr." refers to the separate volume of transcript containing
the motion for new trial. "S. Tr." refers to the separate volume
of transcript containing the sentencing hearing.
2
A total of 29 units were pre-sold by appellant or his
representatives for the Temple Hills Condominium Project between
August 21, 1979, and April 30, 1981. See Exhibit 7.
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Upon receipt of the buyers1 money, appellant did not place
their money in trustf but almost immediately deposited the funds
into

his

general

real

estate

operating

account

with

unrelated monies over which he had sole control (Tr. 28-29)•

other
Two

witnesses from the Department of Business Regulations testified
that

appellant

acted

improperly

under

State

law

by

not

immediately placing the buyers' money in a trust account (Tr. 1,
11-15, 831-833, 838-840).
While certain expenditures were made for the Temple Hills
project

from appellant's

checking

account, other

expenditures

unrelated to Temple Hills were also made from those accounts.
Both

witnesses

from

the

Department

of

Business

Regulations

testified that the trust account requirement precluded appellant
from spending

the buyers' funds on matters other than Temple

Hills (Tr. 12, 831).

By April 29, 1980, virtually all of the

money given to appellant had been spent by him.

None of the

buyers received their investment back in the Temple Hills project
(Tr. 28-29).

The background of these events is detailed below.

Before selling any condominium units, Michael Crockett, an
experienced real estate developer and principal in Sunwest II,
suggested to appellant that the Earnest Money Agreements should
contain a non-refundability clause for the buyers down payment in
order to provide the developers with some freedom to use the
money

(Tr.

30,

46-47,

60-61,

66,

71,

86).

Despite

Crockett was not charged with any criminal offense.
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the

non-refundability clause, Crockett said he believed the buyers'
money needed to be held in trust or escrow.

He also testified

that he did not know their money was being used by appellant for
4
non-Temple Hills purposes (Tr. 48-49f 66, 93-94).
After
appellant

acquired

an

interest

in the landf

he retained Rod

Bullock, a real estate agent for Martensen Real Estate which had
sold appellant the property, as the exclusive listing agent for
future condominium sales (Tr. 99). In order to raise capital, it
was decided to offer a number of buyers an investment inducement
in the form of a discount off the purchase price of a condominium
equal to the actual amount of money they invested (Tr. 103).
In return for their discount, Bullock understood that the
buyers' money was non-refundable.
that prior

to any purchase

Bullock maintained, however,

appellant

expressly

told

him and

several buyers, including the Barlows and Jolleys, that their
money would be held in a trust account, and would be used as
needed only in the Temple Hills project (Tr. Ill; P. Tr. 7-8, 10,
13, 15-16, 22).
Six

of

the

eight

counts

in the

purchases made by, or through, David
estate agent.

information

related

Smith, a licensed

to

real

Mr. Smith invested approximately $38,000.00 of his

On cross examination, Crockett waivered on these points. For
example, he conceded that he personally received some of the
buyers' money as a consultant's fee, and was aware that appellant
used at least some buyer money on other unrelated projects (Tr.
88, 90). The unrelated expenditures were permissible, according
to Crockett, to strengthen appellant's financial qualifications
for funding the Temple Hills Project (Tr. 91-92).
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own in the project

(P. Tr. 34-44.)

down payments were non-refundablef

While Smith knew that his
he said that appellant told

him before investing that the money would be placed in trust and
used exclusively in the project (P. Tr. 41-56).
Mr. Smith also brought Jack Yalden and Heber Pace into the
project

(Tr. 121-122, 143-149).

Mr. Yalden invested based upon

appellantfs representation to him that the money would be held in
trust and used only for Temple Hills (Tr. 121-124) .

Mr. Pace

also understood from discussions with appellant and Smith that
his money would be held in trust and used only in the Temple
Hills project (Tr. 146-149).
Like the other buyers, Joel Barlow and J. Arben Jolley also
purchased

units based

on appellant's

alleged

representations,

prior to purchasing, that their money would be placed in trust
and used solely on Temple Hills (Tr. 161-164, 171, 178-182).
Three

other

buyers

not

named

in

the

Second

Amended

Information also testified on a restricted basis concerning their
5
purchases.
According
to
these
individuals,
appellant
represented to them prior to purchasing that their money would be
held in trust and/or used solely on the Temple Hills project (Tr.
198, 203-208, 265, 267-270, 281, 284-287).

The individuals were Martha Browning, Norman Carlson and Sara
Yates. Pursuant to court order, these buyers were not permitted
to testify with the same breadth as those named in the
information to avoid prejudice to the defendant from evidence of
alleged other crimes for which he was not charged (Tr. 255-263).
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After the buyers made their investments/ appellant obtained
a loan in the fall of 1980 for $400,000.00 from FMA Finance which
was secured by the Temple Hills Property,
loan

The majority of the

($300 f 000.00) was used to pay off the land while about

$100,000.00 was deposited into appellant's operating account and
was used for some of his other business ventures
Appellant
projects

also

used some of the buyers1

including

a

shopping

mall

and

(Tr. 26-27) .

money for his other
mining

venture

(Tr.

305-306, 317-324, 344-347, 391-394, 428-442).
After appellant obtained the FMA loan, he tried to secure
construction
Citizens Bank.

financing

from

a

number

of

lenders

including

Negotiations continued during 1981 and 1982.

The

efforts ultimately failed because Citizens1 officers did not feel
he

had

met

their

loan

commitment

conditions

(Tr. 445-454;

Exhibits 43 and 45).
After Citizens turned appellant down, he defaulted on the
g

FMA loan in March 1982 and the property was sold (Tr. 27, 454).
By April 29, 1980, appellant had essentially spent all of the
buyers' money (Tr. 505-507).

The property was sold to a group of investors headed by David
Smith (Tr. 462-463). The Smith group eventually forced appellant
into involuntary bankruptcy under Chapter 11. (P. Tr. 53).
7
To support this conclusion, an investigator with the Utah
County Attorney's Office, analyzed appellant's checking accounts
from August 1979 through selected periods in 1980 (Tr. 500-503;
Exhibit 47 and 48). This analysis was largely undisputed and, in
fact, appellant's own analysis showed essentially the same thing.
See Exhibit 73.

B.

The Defense Evidence.
Appellant's defense focused on his belief that, based on the

non-refundability

clause

could

the

fully

use

in

the

Earnest

buyers' money

Money Agreements, he

as his own

upon

receipt.

Appellant maintained that he never concealed his intent to do so.
To demonstrate that point, Harold Paulos said that he received
approximately $2,000.00 a month as consulting fees which he knew
came from buyer funds.

He also knew that buyer money was being

spent by appellant on other projects in order to strengthen his
financial qualifications for construction funding

(Tr. 522-529,

551, 555). Mr. Paulos testified that appellant worked tirelessly
on the project even though at one point appellant thought he
would

receive

nothing

out

of

his

continued

involvement

(Tr.

617-619).
Chad
numerous
project

Bauer

was

discussions

a

real estate

with

(Tr. 628f 630-631).

appellant

salesman
about

in 1980 who had
the

Temple

Hills

According to Mr. Bauer, appellant

never waivered in his openly expressed belief that he could use
the buyers' money for unrelated purposes from the moment they
gave their money to him (Tr. 631-638).
Appellant testified in his own defense.

After several years

as a real estate broker, appellant decided to enter the real
estate development field

(Tr. 666-667).

His first project was

Temple Hills which was brought to him in May 1979 by Michael
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Crockett and Rod Bullock (Tr. 668-674) .

At the time he acquired

the land from Martensen Real Estate, he was told that it had
already been accepted by Provo for a 50-unit condominium project.
He later learned that the approval was not final (Tr. 679-686) .
After considerable problems and delaysf appellant obtained final
city approval
amount

on

in February

his

contract

1980.
with

He

renegotiated

Martensen

the payoff

because

of

the

unanticipated difficulties with the City (Tr. 686-687).
As a real estate broker, appellant was familiar with the
requirements for real estate trust accounts.

Appellant readily

admitted that he did not, and never intended tof put the buyers1
money in a trust account.

Appellant explained that he believed

the non-refundability clause in paragraph 1 of the Earnest Money
Agreements made the normal trust requirements inapplicable.

For

that reason he never told anyone that his money would be placed
in trust.

Similarly/ at no time did appellant ever intend to

spend the money only on Temple Hills and, thus, never told the
o

buyers

anything

Appellant

to

emphasized

the

contrary

that

one

of

(Tr.
the

737-742f

main

775-781).

purposes

of

the

Appellant said that Jack Yalden did not ask any questions in
his brief meeting since Yalden was brought there by Smith who
already knew how the project would work (Tr. 748-749). Moreover,
appellant distinctly recalled telling Mrs. Browning that the
money would be spent and not held in trust. He indicated that he
assumed Barlow knew the same. Appellant said he never even met
Mr. Pace and never told Mr. Yates that the money would only be
spent on Temple Hills (Tr. 755-761).
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pre-sell program was to strengthen his financial portfolio and
increase

his net worth

so he could qualify

for

construction

Q

financing on the development (Tr. 728-730, 747).

C.

Motion for New Trial
Appellant, through new counsel, filed a motion for new trial

and a motion for additional time to prepare for a hearing on the
new trial.

(See Motion for New Trial; Motion for Additional Time

to Submit Memorandum, at pp. 197-201 of the record on appeal.)
On January 11, 1985, the Court held a hearing on the motion.

At

the hearing, appellantfs new counsel indicated that more time was
needed to obtain the trial transcript and gather evidence for the
Court to assess fully the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel in
not presenting certain facts at trial.

Although the Court did

not have a specific factual record concerning trial counsel's

Appellant felt that he had a firm loan commitment by the end of
1981 from Citizens Bank. He indicated verbal approval was given
on September 15, 1981, and recalled that he and Mr. Paulos were
elated over finally obtaining a construction loan (Tr. 693-698).
He distinctly recalled a meeting with Cleo Hanson of Citizens
Bank in March of 1982 to finalize satisfying the loan conditions.
In appellant's view, the only condition that posed a problem at
the time was delivery of a title insurance policy on the land
because a lis pendens had been filed by the Smith investor group
tying up the property. This group would not release its hold and
eventually took over the property (Tr. 700-705).
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purported

ineffectiveness,

it

ruled

generally

that

trial

counsel's failure to present evidence of which he was aware fell
within the scope of trial strategy which was not a basis for a
new trial (N. Tr. 5) .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Argument 1:

There is no evidence to support appellant's

conviction for theft under the government's sole prosecutorial
theory

of embezzlement*

In the light most favorable to the

government, the offense was committed, if at all, when the buyers
parted

with

their

money

based

representations by appellant*

on

the

claimed

false

The latest possible date on which

appellant could have spent the money he had received earlier is
irrelevant.
obtained

Subsequent use of money which has been fraudulently

is not an essential element of the offense, just as

non-use is no defense*

The government chose to proceed solely on

an embezzlement theory with no evidentiary support in an effort
to expand the time frame of the offense because it recognized
that

the

only

alternative

basis

for

prosecution,

theft

by

deception, was time-barred under Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-302.
Therefore, the convictions must be reversed.

Argument 2.

In addition to the basis for reversal above, the

convictions must also be reversed because it is impossible to
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tell from the verdict when the jury found appellant committed the
offense, i.e., whether he committed the theft on the first or
second date alleged in each count of the information/ or sometime
in between*

Normally, the date when an offense is committed is

not of the essence in an information.

That general rule is only

true, however, if the entire range of dates alleged is within the
statute of limitations.

There is an important exception where,

as here, the government alleged, and the jury may have found,
that the offense was committed on a date for which prosecution
was time-barred.

Because it is impossible to tell on which datef

if any, the jury unanimously found the offense in each count was
committed, the convictions must be reversed for a new trial.

Argument 3.

The Court erred in denying appellant's motion for a

new trial without holding an evidentiary hearing on the issue of
the

ineffectiveness

adequate

of trial counsel.

In the absence of an

record, the Court could not exercise

The total failure to exercise discretion
requiring

a

remand

for

a

full

hearing

its discretion.

constitutes an abuse
on

the

ineffective

assistance of trial counsel.

Argument 4.

The monetary portion of the sentence was illegal

because the Court imposed a fine and restitution on appellant
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even though he had no financial ability to pay themf and ordered
restitution for persons not named as victims in the information.

ARGUMENT
1. There was insufficient evidence to sustain the
convictions for theft by embezzlement and prosecution
for theft by deception was barred by the statute of
limitations.
(a) There
was
no
evidence
embezzlement conviction.

for

an

On October 7, 1983, appellant was originally charged with
theft

by

deception,

in violation

of

Utah

Code

Annotated, §

76-6-405f and the government advised the Court that it intended
to prosecute the case at trial on that theory.

On September 10,

1984f only seven days before trial, the government filed a new
information charging theft in violation of Utah Code Annotatedf
§76-6-404.

This information amended each count to allege, for

the first time, that the theft occurred between a certain date in

See Appellate Record (A.R.) at 112-115. This "Second Amended
Information" was filed, as required, pursuant to leave of court
under Rule 4(d), U. R. Crim. P., which provides in part that the
court may permit an information "to be amended at any time before
verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the
substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced".
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1979

(when

appellant

each
had

buyer

spent

invested)
all

of

the

and

April

money).

29,
The

1980

(when

government

abandoned its theft by deception theory, and indicated that it
now intended to try the case on an embezzlement theory.

A.R. at

97.
Despite the government's tactical maneuvering, there was no
evidence at trial to support an embezzlement prosecution.

The

date of April 29, 1980, added to each count by the September 1984
information/ was apparently chosen by the government in an effort
to expand the time frame of the offense by claiming that it was
not until then that appellant had spent all of the buyers' money
he had earlier obtained by deception.

This datef however, is

legally immaterial to establish when the offenses were committed.
The

offense,

if

any,

was

committed

when

the

buyers

claim

See A.R. at 74-81, 93.
The original information filed in
Eighth Circuit Court contained five counts which corresponded by
investor to counts 1-3, 7 and 8 of the Second Amend€>d
Information/ but did not plead a range of offense dates in each
count.
Before appellant's initial appearance, another information,
styled an "Amended Information", was filed in Eighth Circuit
Court on October 27, 1983, without leave of court as required
under Rule 4(d), U. R. Crim. P. This information alleged theft
in violation of Utah Code Annotated, §76-6-404. A.R. at 67-71.
It added four new counts which corresponded by investor to counts
4-6 and 9 of the Second Amended Information.
Like the first
information, this information did not include a range of dates
for offense commission.
After a preliminary examination on
January 18, 1980, in Eighth Circuit Court, two counts of the
amended information, not at issue here, were struck. On January
24, 1980, the amended information, as modified at the preliminary
hearing, was filed in Fourth District Court. A.R. at 67.
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appellant

caused

them

to

invest

by

falsely

representing

his

intent to put their money in trust and use it only on Temple
Hills.
There is no evidence that appellant's intent to keep their
moneyf whether in good faith or fraudulentf was not formed until
April 29, 1980.

The evidence, in fact, was all to the contrary.

Every buyer called by the government testified that, at the time
they invested, appellant represented to them their money would be
held in trust and/or only spent on the Temple Hills project.12
Accepting their testimony, these representations were false, when
made, causing the buyers to part with their money.

This offense

is, at best, theft by deception under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-405.
It was committed and complete, if at all, when appellant obtained
the money by deception.
1983);

State v. Lakey, 659 P.2d 1061 (Utah

State v. Forshee, 588 P.2d

181

(Utah 1978); State v.

Taylor, 378 P.2d 352 (Utah 1963); £!ee State v. Saylor, 618 P.2d
1166 (Kan. 1980) (Kansas statute nearly identical to Utah's).
As already noted, the government recognized that prosecution
was time-barred for theft by deception and filed the September
1984 information alleging theft generally, under Utah Code Ann.,

See testimony of David Smith (P. Tr. 41-56); Jack Yalden (Tr.
121-124); Heber Pace (Tr. 146-149); Joel Barlow (Tr. 161-164);
Joseph Barlow (Tr. 178-182); Martha Browning (Tr. 203-208);
Norman Carlson (Tr. 267-270); and Sara Yates (Tr. 284-287).
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§76-6-404, in an apparent attempt to expand the time frame of the
offense by prosecuting the theft on an embezzlement theory.

The

facts, however^ simply do not support the government's theory.
13
Paced with a strategic decisionf
the government chose to ignore
the critical distinction made by this Court between theft by
deception and embezzlement in State v. Taylor, supra:
Fundamental in the nature of embezzlement is the
coming into possession of property honestly, "by virtue
of one's trust," and then converting it to one's own use
in violation of that trust.
This is in contrast to
situations where, as here, the essential wrong is
committed in obtaining possession of the property.
Where the intent to take the property is formed before
the taking, and is coupled with some deception or trick
to acquire possession of the property, the crime is not
embezzlement. One could not embezzle that which he had
already stolen.
Since the State did not prove the
charge upon which the conviction is grounded, it is
reversed.
378

P. 2d

at

354

(footnotes

and

citations

omitted)

(emphasis

added). See Moore v. United States, 160 U.S. 268, 269 (1895);
United

States

(embezzlement

v.
and

Trevino,
theft

491

are

F.2d

74, 75

inconsistent

(5th Cir. 1974)

since

embezzlement

13
The government's choice was either to prosecute an offense for
which there was arguably some evidence, i.e., theft by deception,
but for which the statute of limitations had clearly run, or,
alternatively, pursue multiple counts on an embezzlement theory
of prosecution with no evidentiary support.
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presupposes

lawful/

honest

possession

while

theft

does not);

State v, McCormick/ 442 P.2d 134 (Ariz. 1968). 14
The government elected to proceed solely on an embezzlement
theory without any evidence to support it.

It did so because/ as

discussed belowf prosecution on the alternative theory of theft
by deception was clearly time-barred.

b. The statute of
theft by deception.
The

appropriate

statute

limitation
of

had

limitations/

run
Utah

on
Code Ann.f

§76-1-302/ requires that a felony prosecution must be commenced
within four years from the time the offense is committed.

Thusf

for

false

investments

made

in

1979

based

on

alleged

representations/ the statute of limitations had clearly run in
1983 unless the thefts were somehow not committed until 1980.

While consolidation is not an issue heref it is worth noting
that in order to avoid the technical pleadings problems presented
by such cases as Taylory
the Utah legislature adopted
consolidated theft provisions embracing a number of larceny-type
common law offenses into a single statutory offense in 1973. See
Utah
Code
Annotated/
§76-6-403.
Even
after
statutory
consolidation/ of course/ the government must still prove that
the offense was committed in some manner. See State v. Seekford/
638 P.2d 525/ 526-27 (Utah 1981); see also/ State v. Saylory
supraf 618 P.2d at 1169-1170.
Further/ consolidation is
immaterial when there is no evidence for one of the offenses or
the statute of limitations has run. For examplef a prosecution
could proceed on alternative theories of theft £r receiving
stolen property if it was not clear whether the defendant
actually stole or simply received the property/ as long as there
was some evidence to convict on either theory. Iff however, the
statute of limitation had run on the theft/ but not on the later
receipt/ the government could not mesh the two offenses in order
to avoid the time bar.
In that casef the government would be
required to prove that the defendant received the property/ not
stole itf to avoid the statute of limitations.
-18-

Whether one accepts the government's theory that appellant made
misrepresentations when he took the buyers' money, or appellant's
position

that

he

did

not,

it

is clear

that

appellant

never

intended to place the buyers' money in trust and always intended
to use at least some of it on non-Temple Hills projects.

Thus,

appellant's intent to keep the money was formed and complete on
the date when each buyer invested his money, i.e., on the first
date of each count in the information.15
No theory of theft depends upon whether a defendant actually
spends or disposes of the money he has stolen or embezzled.

In

fact, the crime is complete when the defendant has the intent to
keep the money regardless of what, if anything, he does with it
after the crime.

See State v. Lakey, supra; State v. Taylor,

supra; United States v. Mack, 525 P. Supp. 382 (N.D. Tex. 1981)
(money stolen, not embezzled, when defendant received funds with
previously formed intention of appropriating it to her own use);
United States v. Goldsmith, 274 F. Supp. 494

(E.D. Pa. 1967)

(embezzlement complete once owner deprived of ownership); United
States v. Mosley, 507 F.2d 257 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 420 U.S.
991 (1974) (wrongfully taking is the touchstone of embezzlement,
not further disposition); United States v. Powell, 294 F. Supp.

The latest date on which even embezzlement could have been
committed, under the government's flawed embezzlement notion, was
when appellant failed to place the buyers' money in trust but,
instead, put it in his own checking account over which he had
sole control.
As the chart on page 4 shows, this would not
affect the statute of limitations argument.
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1353

(E.D.

Va.), afffd,

413

F.2d

1037

(4th

Cir.

1969)

(embezzlement does not depend on disposition of property).
A pair of distinctly different hypotheticals illustrate this
principle of law.

Take, for example, a bank teller who embezzles

$1,000.00 from the bank's till on January 1.

The teller has

embezzled funds at that time even if the money is spent one, five
or ten years later.

Indeed, the crime has been committed even if

the teller never spends the money and returns it to the bank at a
subsequent time.

Modifying those facts slightly, but critically,

the same bank teller may embezzle money from the bank's till
continually

at the rate of

$100.00 a month until a total of

$1,000.00 has been embezzled.
In the first case, there was one completed theft at the time
the teller took the $1,000.00 regardless of how, when, or whether
he ever spent or returned the money.

In the second hypothetical,

the teller committed a series of thefts over a period of time.
In the instant case, appellant took each buyer's money at
one specific time even though he spent it over a period of time.
The crime, if any, was complete when each buyer parted with his
money

based

on the claimed

false

representations.

There is

absolutely no evidence at all to the contrary.

c.
The government failed to prove the
offense was committed within the statute of
limitations.
It is well-established that criminal statutes of limitation
are jurisdictional and must be construed liberally in favor in of
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the accused

and strictly against

the government.

Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115

See, e.g. ,

(1970); State v.

Eilts, 596 P.2d 1050 (Ct. App. Wash. 1979); Padie v. State, 557
P.2d 1138
1975);

(Alaska 1976); People v. Zamora, 557 P.2d 75 (Cal.

State

v.

Fogel, 492 P.2d

742

(Ct. App. Ariz. 1972);

Cunningham v. District Court of Tulsa County, 432 P.2d 992 (Ct.
Crim. App. Okla. 1967) .
Ordinarily,

of

course,

the

date

of

an

offense

is not

essential in pleading a crime as long as prosecution has been
brought within the statute of limitations.

See State v. Bundy,

684 P.2d 58 (Utah 1984); State v. Tacconi, 171 P.2d 388 (Utah
1946); State v. Distefano, 262 P. 113 (Utah 1927).

This is true,

however, only when "fnlo contention is made that the statute of
limitations may have run".

State v. Bundy, 684 P.2d at 62; State

v. Fergusen, 558 P.2d 1092, 1095 (Kan. 1976) (time unessential
since no statute of limitations involved).
There is an important exception to the general rule if it
appears from the facts that the statute of limitations may have
run.

In that case, as here, the government must prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that the offense was committed within the time
permitted by the statute of limitations.

See, e.g., Grunewald v.

United States, 353 U.S. 391, 414-415; State v. Young, 440 N.E.2d
1379, 1381 (Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County 1981); United States
v. Wolf, 407 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Mo. 1975); People v. Kohut, 282
N.E.2d 312, 315 (N.Y. 1972); State v. Newton, 81 P. 1002 (Wash.
1905) .
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The facts in this case demonstrate

that the offense was

committedf if at all, when appellant made the misrepresentations
to the buyers and took their money with the intent to exercise
complete control over itf i.e., at the time of the investment.
Prosecution was commenced under the Second Amended
more

than

four

years

beyond

that

date

and

is

Information
time-barred.

Therefore/ the convictions must be reversed.

2. The jury verdict is ambiguous regarding the statute
of limitations.
In an apparent attempt to avoid the statute of limitations
bar, the government filed a "Second Amended Information" which
added a range of dates ending with April 29, 1980f to each count.
As already demonstrated, however, the addition of this date on
which appellant ran out of money bears no relationship to when
the offense may have been committed and must be rejected.

This

is not to suggest that how appellant spent the money was not
arguably relevant to his earlier intent at the time he took it.
Such subsequent use was not an element of the crime, however, and
cannot extend the statute for an offense which has already been
committed.
Most importantly, the information, as framed with a range of
dates, included dates for which prosecution was barred and some
for which it was not.
verdict

regarding

when

This necessarily led to an ambiguous jury
appellant
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had

the

criminal

intent

to

commit the offenses, i.e., at the time he took the buyers' money
or when he finally spent all of it.

If the jury, or some of

them, found that appellant had such intent on the first date
alleged

in

time-barred.

each

count,

then

the

offenses

would

be

clearly

If, on the other hand, the jury, or some of them,

found that such intent was not formed until the money was finally
spent, then the offenses would not be time-barred.
It is likewise possible that some, or all, of the jurors
found

appellant

somewhere
count.

formed

in between

the

intent

the beginning

to keep the buyers' money
and

ending

dates

in each

It is simply impossible to tell for which, if any, of

these alternatives the jury found appellant guilty.

That is why

the date of offense is critical in this case.
The jury verdict in this case does not reflect when the jury
unanimously concluded appellant committed the offenses.
whether they ever so concluded is in doubt.

Indeed,

For example, count 2

alleged that the offense was committed "on or between August 27,
1979, and April 29, 1980".
offense

was

committed

prosecution was barred.

on

The jury may have found that the
August

27,

1979,

in

which

case

Or, it might have found the offense was

committed on April 29, 1980, in which case there was no evidence
to

support

it.

To

add

to

the

confusion

created

by

the

As already demonstrated, such a finding would have had no
factual foundation because there was no evidence from which a
jury could have possibly concluded appellant's intent to keep the
money was not formed until after the buyers had invested.
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government,

four

jurors

may

have

felt

that

the

offense was

committed on August 27, 1979, while four others may have felt the
offense was committed on April 29, 1980.

Thusf the jury may have

found appellant guilty on this count even though there was no
unanimity on this critical element.
Because it cannot be determined from the verdict whether the
jury unanimously

agreed that appellant

committed

the offenses

within the statute limitations, its verdict is ambiguous and must
be reversed for a new trial.
supra, 353 U.S. at 414-415

See Grunewald v. Dnited States,

(convictions reversed where it was

impossible to tell whether jury found all necessary elements were
committed within statute of limitations); State v. Tacconi, 171
P.2d

388

evidence

(Utah 1946)

(conviction

to establish

commission

reversed where

insufficient

of offense within

statutory

period).
As one Court of Appeals noted:
When one is charged with having committed a crime by
several methods and there is a deficiency of proof as
to one or more of those methods, the court must set
aside the verdict unless it can ascertain that the jury
founded its verdict upon one of the methods with regard
to which substantial evidence has been introduced.
State v. Carothers, 84 Wash. 2d 256, 525 2d 731 (1974).
There is no indication that the jury returned special
verdicts or made special findings.
The jury was
instructed that in order to convict Mr. Vandenburg it
had to agree unanimously as to any one of the
alternative modes by which the crime has been charged.
The jury may properly have convicted upon the basis of
either or both of the other alternative modes. From a
general verdict, however, we cannot ascertain upon
which alternative mode the jury agreed unanimously.
Accordingly, we must reverse the judgment and remand
the case for new trial.
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State v. Vandenburg, 544 P.2d 1251 (Ct. App. Wash. 1976).

Put

differently,

two

where

evidence

is

defective

on

one

of

alternatives for guilt in the same count, the ambiguity of the
verdict requires reversal.

See United States v. Natelli, 527

F.2d 311, 325 (2d Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976).
In the present case, the prosecution did not proceed on
alternative

theories.

In

fact, the

government

deliberately

abandoned prosecution for theft by deception seven days before
trial, when it filed the new information, in order to gain the
substantial

tactical

insufficient

advantage

embezzlement

of

theory.

multiple

charges

Based on the

under

an

government's

tactics, appellant had no opportunity to, and did not, defend
against the abandoned theft by deception alternative.
The

problem

was

compounded

because

the

jury

was

not

instructed that it had to agree unanimously on the date of the
offense.

For example, in jury instruction number 7

149-150) , the

jury was

told only

(A.R. at

that one of the essential

elements of the crime in each count included the exercise of
unauthorized control "on or about the respective dates stated in
each count of the information".

The instruction given did not

address the problem presented here because it did not explain
that,

under

the

circumstances

of

this

case, the

jury

unanimously agree on when appellant committed the crime.
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must

The

jury

verdict

is

convictions must be reversed.

fatally
17

ambiguous

and

appellant's

3* The Court erred in denying the motion for new trial
without allowing new counsel time to prepare an
adequate record.
The Court held a hearing on appellant's new trial motion
before new counsel obtained the transcript to present a rational
and supportable basis for new trial based on fact.

Further,

counsel requested additional time, under Rule 24(b)f and stressed
that many of the matters intended to be raised on the motion were
matters outside

the

recordf

going to trial counsel's overall

ineffectiveness.
There was no way for the Court to exercise its discretion in
the absence

of

an adequate

record.

The Court's failure to

exercise discretion constituted an abuse.
this case.

The reason is clear in

There is now nothing for this Court to review in a

meaningful manner because an adequate record was not made in
disposing of the motion.
reversed

and

remanded

At a minimum, this matter must be

for a full

fact hearing

regarding the

effective assistance of trial counsel.

While this Court could remand for a new trial, any attempt to
retry appellant on the same facts using a different theory, i.e.,
theft by deception, raises serious double jeopardy questions.
See Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978); Burks v. United States,
437 U.S. 1 (1978) .
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This was not a case of new counsel's failure to prepare; it
was a question of not having time to do so.

The Court apparently

believed there was nothing that trial counsel could have failed
to do that would not fall within the realm of unassailable trial
strategy

(See N. Tr. 5) . With due respect to the trial court,

appellant should have had a meaningful opportunity to present
evidence outside the record concerning the ineffective assistance
of counsel so the Court could have exercised
This Court could then have provided meaningful
lower

court's

decision*

Trial

preparation were particularly

counsel's

crucial

its discretion.
review of the

effectiveness

and

in this case where the

trial court itself noted that it "may have voted differently than
the jury if [sic] were on the jury" (S. Tr. 10) .

The matter

should be remanded for a full evidentiary hearing on a motion for
new trial with adequate time for new counsel to present evidence
and affidavits in support of the motion.

4. The Court erred in ordering appellant to pay a fine
and make restitution.
Despite being advised at sentencing that appellant could not
repay

the buyers, the Court imposed a fine on appellant and

ordered restitution without an inquiry into his ability to pay
(S. Tr. 6-7). This Court has noted that fines and restitution
are generally disfavored for defendants who lack the ability to
pay.

State

v.

Peterson,

681
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P.2d

1210,

1222-1223

(1984)

(Stewart, J. concurring).

See also, Moore v. United Statesf 150

P.2d 323, 325 (10th Cir. 1945).
In addition, there are several procedural
infirmities in the Court's ordered restitution.

and

substantive

For example, the

Court did not make its reasons for ordering restitution a part of
its written

order, nor did

it indicate that

it considered

various

the

criteria
specified
by
law. See
Utah
Code
Ann.,
18
§76-3-201(3).
Further, the restitution ordered by the Court

Section 76-3-201(3) provides in part:
(a) When a person is adjudged guilty of criminal
activity which has resulted in pecuniary damages, in
addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court
shall order that the defendant make restitution up to
double the amount of pecuniary damages to the victim or
victims of the offense of which the defendant has
pleaded guilty, is convicted, or to the victim of any
other criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the
sentencing court unless the court in applying the
criteria in Subsection (b) finds that restitution is
inappropriate.
If
the
court
determines
that
restitution is appropriate or inappropriate, the court
shall make the reasons for the decision a part of its
written order.
(b) In determining whether or not to order
restitution, or restitution which is complete, partial,
or nominal, the court shall take into account:
(i) The financial resources of the defendant and
the burden that payment of restitution will impose,
with due regard to the other obligations of the
defendant;
(ii) The
ability
of
the
defendant
to
pay
restitution on an installment basis or on other
conditions to be fixed by the court;. . .
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appears to contemplate restitution to alleged victims of offenses
for which the appellant was neither charged, nor convicted, or
admitted his guilt in clear violation of §76-3-201(3)(a).

To the

extent that the restitution order was meant to encompass such
alleged victims, its scope is clearly invalid.
The manner of enforcement for appellantfs failure to pay the
fine and restitution
Normally,

a

is also unclear under the court's order.

defendant

who

fails

to

pay

a

fine

or

make

restitution, which he has the ability to do, may be sentenced to
additional unspecified imprisonment for contempt of court.
Utah Code Ann., §76-3-201.1(2).

See

In the instant case, the overly

broad restitution order and the Court's failure to comply with
the substantive and procedural provisions of the law, coupled
with

appellant's

potentially

contempt, collectively

raise

indefinite
serious

against imprisonment for debt.

imprisonment

constitutional

for

questions

See Utah Const., Art. I §16;

Harris v. Harris, 377 P.2d 1007 (Utah 1963).
This

Court

does not

need

to

reach

these

constitutional

issues, but instead should remand the matter for a full hearing
on

whether

appellant

has

the

ability

to

pay

the

fine

and

restitution with instructions that restitution may in no event
exceed the actual pecuniary damages of the people named in the
information.

See Utah Code Ann., §76-3-201(4)(b) .
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CONCLUSION
Appellant requests the following relief:
1.

Reversal of his conviction on all counts because the

evidence was

insufficient

for embezzlement

and prosecution is

time-barred for theft by deception.
2.

In the alternative, reversal and remand for new trial on

all counts because it was impossible to tell whether the jury
found

appellant

committed

an

offense

within

the

statute

of

limitations.
3.

In the alternative, a remand for hearing on appellant's

motion for new trial based on the ineffective assistance of trial
counsel.
4.

In

the

alternative,

a

remand

for

a

hearing

on

appellant's ability to pay the fine and restitution as well as on
the scope of the ordered restitution.
WHEREFORE

it

is

respectfully

submitted

that

appellant's

convictions should be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 37

day of January, 1986.

CLYDE & PRATT
Attorneys for Appellant
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